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Security Council

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

Note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and referring to the latter's note has the honour to report the following information:

The Czech Republic supports United Nations Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) and is fully committed to the implementation of this resolution according to its paragraph 19.

The Czech Republic, as an European Union Member State, is taking part in the preparation of the European Union's legal instruments implementing the provisions of resolution 1737 (2006) with the aim to adopt them without delay.

More detailed information in this regard is to be conveyed to the Security Council by the Presidency of the European Union. After the adoption of the relevant European Union Council regulation, all legal instruments will be automatically applied to the Czech national legislation.

The Czech Republic is pleased to further inform the Committee that on the national level, the Czech Republic, as a member of all relevant control regimes, has already in place all the necessary tools to be able to implement the above-mentioned resolution on the export of sensitive goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

07-25643 (E) 080307

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

Note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and has the honour to submit the report of the Government of the Republic of Croatia on the steps it has taken with a view to implementing the provisions of the aforementioned resolution (see annex).

07-25649 (E) 090307

Annex to the note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

Report of the Republic of Croatia on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006)

Paragraph 19:

Decides that all States shall report to the Committee on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 above.

In accordance with resolution 1737 (2006) adopted by the Security Council on 24 December 2006, and, in particular, paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17, the Republic of Croatia has taken concrete measures and legislative procedures in implementing the sanctions introduced against Iran.

1. According to the article 2 of the Law on International Restrictive Measures, passed by the Croatian Parliament, on 3 November 2004, effective as of 24 December 2004, the Republic of Croatia introduces, implements or abolishes international restrictive measures against states, international organizations, territorial entities, movements or physical and legal subjects to: (i) ensure the implementation of internationally binding decisions of the Organization of the United Nations; (ii) when aligning with restrictive measures of other international organizations; (iii) in other cases according to international law.

For the purpose of implementation of the mentioned Law, the Government of Croatia has established the *Task Force for implementation and monitoring of the Law on International Restrictive Measures* by its Decision of 24 February 2005, amended by the Decision of 14 September 2006. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI) is presiding over its work. The Task Force is composed of members — delegates from the following Ministries: MFAEI, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Economy, Labour and Entrepreneurship, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of the Sea, Tourism, Transport and Development and the Ministry of Justice.

The Task Force for implementation and monitoring of the Law on International Restrictive Measures has drafted and submitted to the Government of the Republic of Croatia for adoption the Decision on the implementation of measures established in the United Nations Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) regarding sanctions against Iran.

2. *The National Licensing Authority for Import/Export Control of Weapons for Commercial Purposes*, which issues export/import licences for weapons for commercial purposes (comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, and the Ministry of Economy, Work and Entrepreneurship, operating on the basis of article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the *Decree on Goods Subject to Import and Export Licensing* ("Official Gazette" nr. 118/01, 108/02 and 134/02), has been duly informed about the sanctions imposed by resolution 1737 (2006) on Iran and it has undertaken all measures in order to:

(1) to prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer, or for the use in or benefit of Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely, those set out in the lists of documents S/2006/814, S/2006/815 and S/2006/816;

(2) to prevent any transfers to Iran of technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services, and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;

(3) to prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within its territory or by their nationals, of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.

3. *The Tax Department* conducted a search of its databases for all purchases and sales of real estate, tangible and intangible property, as well as financial transactions of humanitarian organizations and associations connected to physical and legal persons as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006), and, particularly, to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex, as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above.

4. *The Customs Department* searched its database for illicit transfers of cash over the state border pertaining to physical and legal persons as referred to in the resolution 1737 (2006). It also strengthened the overall control of traffic of goods across the border, of the transfer of money, in order to:

(1) freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through illicit means;

(2) prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to Iran of: all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in the lists of documents S/2006/814, S/2006/815 and S/2006/816 and Corr.1, which could contribute to Iran's nuclear-related ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes.

5. *The Division of Foreign Exchange Inspectorate* searched its database looking for transactions made by physical and legal persons as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006), in order to identify or prevent illicit transfers of cash over the state border.

6. *The Anti-Money-Laundering Department* requested from the Ministry of the Interior, the State Prosecutor and the Croatian National Bank to additionally examine their files and identify potential physical and legal persons as referred to in the resolution 1737 (2006), in order to freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated by the Security Council Committee. Until today, there has been no single case of frozen assets, in Croatia, neither of account numbers or monetary values, which would require the freezing of assets, belonging to individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006).

7. The Border Police of the *Ministry of the Interior* prevents the movements of persons as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) across the state border, in accordance with the Law on the State Border Control, as well as of the Law on Foreigners.

The Croatian Border Police has been instructed to take precautionary measures, and to be prepared, should it so require, to prevent the entry into or transit through Croatian territories, on border crossings, including domestic and international flights at the airports, of the persons designated by the Committee or by the Security Council as being responsible for Iranian policies in relation to Iran's nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related and other weapons of mass destruction-related programmes, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006).

To date, Croatian authorities have identified no physical and legal persons as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) that attempted to enter or transit the country.

8. The Republic of Croatia has been a member of the *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)*, since 1993, and it is a Party to the *Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)*, since 2001.

Croatia has been a Party to the *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)*, since 2001, a Party to the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, since 2001.

Croatia has been a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), as well as of the Zangger Committee.

The Republic of Croatia has accepted the *Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*, as well as the *Supplementary Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources*.

As a result of its intensive technical cooperation in international projects with the IAEA, Croatia has received and installed two screen portals for detecting nuclear and other radioactive material, which could be used for building an atomic bomb, at the border crossing with the Republic of Slovenia, at Bregana.

The Republic of Croatia has accepted *The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation*, in November 2002.

Croatia has no Ballistic Missile programmes and does not participate, bilaterally or multilaterally, in any Ballistic Missile programme. Croatia has no Ballistic Missile Systems or Ballistic Missile Land (test) launch sites. Croatia does not participate, bilaterally nor multilaterally in any Ballistic Missile Land (test) launch site and has never launched a Ballistic Missile.

The Croatian national legislation enables Croatia to comply fully with the requirements of Security Council resolution 1737 (2006).

The Croatian legislation contains provisions that criminalize support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in the supply of weapons, including nuclear weapons, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006). The main provisions are contained in the Criminal Code, the Trade Act and Government Decision on Determination on Goods Imported and Exported on the Basis of Licenses and the Law on Production, Overhaul and Trade of Weapons and Military Equipment.

Until today, no financial assets or economic resource of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) have been found in Croatia.

However, any relevant information such as types of assets frozen, account numbers and monetary value of frozen assets of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in the resolution 1737 (2006) in Croatia shall be promptly indicated to the Committee.

Conclusion:

Croatia has no Ballistic Missile programmes and does not participate, bilaterally or multilaterally, in any Ballistic Missile programme. Croatia has no Ballistic Missile Systems or Ballistic Missile Land (test) launch sites. Croatia does not participate, bilaterally nor multilaterally in any Ballistic Missile Land (test) launch site and has never launched a Ballistic Missile.

To date, Croatian authorities have identified no groups or individuals that have attempted to supply, sell or transfer weapons or military equipment or to provide technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provisions, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (1) and (2) above, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) has been identified.

Until today, no financial assets or economic resource of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) have been found in Croatia.

However, any relevant information such as types of assets frozen, account numbers and monetary value of frozen assets of the individuals, groups, undertakings and entities referred to in resolution 1737 (2006) in Croatia shall be promptly indicated to the Committee.

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

Note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and, with reference to the latter's note verbale dated 7 February 2007, has the honour to submit herewith a report pursuant to operative paragraph 19 of the said resolution (see annex).

07-25655 (E) 140307

Annex to the note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

JAPAN

Report to the Security Council Committee (hereinafter "the Committee") established pursuant to the Security Council resolution 1737 (2006) (hereinafter "the resolution") with regard to the implementation of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 12 and 17 of the resolution.

The Government of Japan (hereinafter "the Government") has taken the following measures with a view to steadily implementing the relevant paragraphs of the Resolution.

1. Announcement by the Government on February 16, 2007

Based on the resolution and the Cabinet approval on February 16, 2007, the Government announced that it would invoke "Measures based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (Law No. 228 of 1948) (hereinafter "Foreign Exchange Law") to Prevent the Transfer of Financial Resources and to Prohibit the Import of Items related to Iran's Proliferation Sensitive Nuclear Activities and Development of Nuclear Weapon Delivery Systems (hereinafter "Iran's nuclear and other activities")" through Foreign Exchange Law, starting from February 17, to implement paragraphs 6, 7, and 12 of the resolution.

In addition to the aforementioned paragraphs, the Government announced that it would reinforce the implementation of the measures with regard to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 10 and 17 of the resolution, which had been already taken under the relevant national legislation in force.

2. The measures taken by the Government

2-1 Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5

The Government has already taken, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Law, and regulations established under the said Law such as the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949) (for goods) and the Foreign Exchange Order (Cabinet Order No. 260 of 1980) (for technologies), necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology

which could contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities as specified in paragraphs 3 and 4.

Under these measures, exportation to Iran, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution continues to be subject to licensing by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. In light of the resolution, licenses will not be granted for exportation to Iran of the aforementioned items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, besides exceptions which the Committee determines.

2-2 Paragraph 6

The Government has taken, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Law and the Cabinet approval, necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or services, and the transfer of financial resources, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution.

Under these measures, provision to Iran of technical assistance or training, brokering or services related to the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution continues to be subject to licensing by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. In light of the resolution, licenses will not be granted for provision to Iran of technical assistance or training, brokering or services related to the aforementioned items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, besides exceptions which the Committee determines.

Under these measures, transfer of financial resources to Iran for the purpose of which is to contribute to supply, sale or transfer to Iran, or manufacture or use in Iran, of the items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution is also subject to licensing by the Minister of Finance. In light of the resolution, licenses will not be granted for transfer of financial resources to Iran for the purpose of which is to contribute to supply, sale or transfer to Iran, or manufacture or use in Iran, of the aforementioned items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, besides exceptions which the Committee determines.

2-3 Paragraph 7

The Government has taken, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Law and the Cabinet approval, necessary measures to prohibit the import of any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815.

Under these measures, importation of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815, originating from or shipped from Iran, is subject to approval of the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. In light of the resolution, approvals will not be granted for these items.

2-4 Paragraph 10

The Government has already initiated, in accordance with the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (hereinafter "Immigration Control Act"), necessary measures to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through its territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's nuclear and other activities, and to notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through its territories of the 12 persons designated in the annex of the resolution.

Under these measures, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exercises strict vigilance in examination of entry/transit visas for the entry into Japan or transit of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's nuclear and other activities, and those designated in the annex of the resolution. The Ministry of Justice, in accordance with the Immigration Control Act, also exercises strict vigilance in landing examinations and examinations of applications for certificates of eligibility.

The Government will notify without delay the Committee of the entry into or transit through its territories of the 12 persons designated in the annex of the resolution, as well as other persons, if any, who will be additionally designated by the Security Council or the Committee.

2-5 Paragraph 12

The Government has taken, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Law and the Cabinet approval, necessary measures to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources, which are within

Japanese territory and owned or controlled by the 10 entities and 12 persons designated in the annex of the resolution as being engaged in Iran's nuclear and other activities, and to ensure that such funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being available by any persons or entities, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities.

Under these measures, payments to or by, and capital transactions with, those designated in the annex of the resolution are subject to licensing by the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. In light of the resolution, licenses will not be granted for these payments and capital transactions, besides the exceptions stipulated in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15.

The Government is prepared to take necessary measures to freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources of those persons, if any, who will be additionally designated by the Security Council or the Committee.

2-6 Paragraph 17

The Government has already initiated necessary measures to exercise vigilance and to prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within Japanese territory or by Japanese nationals, of discipline which would contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities, in accordance with the Foreign Exchange Law and the Foreign Exchange Order under the said Law (with regard to transfer of technology) as well as the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Immigration Control Act (with regard to the entry into Japan).

Under these measures, transfer of technology, which would contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities, to non-resident Iranian nationals from resident Japanese nationals continues to be subject to licensing by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry. In light of the resolution, licenses will not be granted for the aforementioned technology.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the Law for the Establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exercises strict vigilance regarding specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities in examination of visas for the entry into Japan. The Ministry of Justice, in accordance with the Immigration Control Act, also exercises strict vigilance regarding specialized teaching or training

of Iranian nationals of disciplines which would contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities in landing examinations, status of residence examinations and examinations of applications for certificates of eligibility.

The Government has already initiated necessary measures to inform all the relevant education and research organizations such as universities of the obligations under the resolution and regulations in place under the national legislation regarding prevention of transfer of technology which could contribute to Iran's nuclear and other activities.

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2 March 2007
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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

Note verbale dated 21 February 2007 from the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) and has the honour to transmit the report of France under paragraph 19 of resolution 1737 (2006) on the steps taken by the Government of France to implement effectively the provisions of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 17 of that resolution (see annex).

07-25661 (E) 120307 130307

Annex to the note verbale dated 21 February 2007 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee by the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Report of France to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

In paragraph 19 of its resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006, the Security Council "*Decides that all States shall report to the Committee within 60 days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 [of this resolution]*".

In accordance with those provisions, France wishes to bring to the attention of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) the following information on the steps taken in order to ensure full implementation of that resolution.

Implementation of the resolution by the member States of the European Union gives rise, in the case of some provisions, to European measures (common position and Community regulation) and, in the case of others, to national measures.

On 12 February 2007, the Council of the European Union gave its political endorsement to a common position comprising the following restrictive measures against Iran:

- An embargo on all sensitive goods and technologies listed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime;
- Measures of prohibition on entry into and transit through the territory of the member States of the European Union and measures to freeze the financial assets of persons or entities listed in resolution 1737 (2006), as well as the possibility for the European Union to add to the list the names of other persons or entities associated with Iran's nuclear and ballistic programmes;
- A commitment to prevent all training or teaching for Iranian nationals in disciplines related to these programmes.

A community implementing regulation is now under discussion.

1. Embargo on items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to nuclear and delivery system programmes

The export from France of nuclear dual-use goods or of Category II items of the Missile Technology Control Regime is subject to a regime for the control of exports in accordance with amended Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000, which is supplemented at the national level by Decree No. 2001-1192 of 13 December 2001 relating to control of the export, import and transfer of dual-use goods and technology.

Re-exports of dual-use items which have the status of non-Community goods likewise require authorization. Accordingly, non-Community goods imported into the territory of the European Community require authorization for re-export, whether in their original state or as a component of a larger unit.

All French Government agencies responsible for export control have been notified of resolution 1737 (2006). Consequently, no licence can be issued for the export to Iran of dual-use nuclear or ballistic items, equipment, goods and technology referred to in resolution 1737 (2006).

2. Vigilance in regard to the movements of persons involved in nuclear and ballistic programmes and notification requirement with regard to the movements of certain officials listed in the annex to the resolution

Since the adoption of resolution 1696 (2006), the French consular authorities have exercised heightened vigilance in regard to visa applications submitted by Iranian nationals potentially associated with nuclear and delivery system programmes.

Since 26 December 2006, the French authorities have alerted all French consular offices around the world and circulated to them the list of persons covered by resolution 1737 (2006). No visas will be granted to these individuals, subject to the exceptions duly provided for by resolution 1737 (2006).

3. Freezing of financial assets and economic resources and prohibition of funding

A European Union Council regulation on the subject will be adopted shortly. On 8 February 2007, as an interim measure, the Prime Minister issued Decree No. 2007-169, regulating financial relations with Iran, on the proposal of the Minister of the Economy, Finance and Industry. Under this decree, the following are subject to the prior authorization of the Minister of the Economy:

- Currency transactions, capital flows and payments of all kinds between France and foreign countries carried out by or on behalf of the natural and legal persons mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006) or controlled by them;
- The constitution and liquidation of investments in France by and for the natural and legal persons mentioned in resolution 1737 (2006) or controlled by them.

No authorization will be granted to the entities and persons listed.

4. Ban on the provision of all financial assistance, financial services and investment related to goods and technology prohibited by operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution

A regulation of the Council of the European Union is under discussion which would provide a directly applicable legal basis for prohibiting the provision, by private economic actors, of the financial services mentioned in the resolution.

In regard to State credit insurance policy, Coface has established a warning system at the request of the Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry as part of the credit insurance policy for 2007. Henceforth, enterprises wishing to export goods to Iran which apply to Coface for credit insurance must sign a document undertaking to comply with the specific regulations on exports of dual-use goods and technology. Failure to report that goods, services or technology in respect of which the credit insurance application is made could be intended for or contribute to Iran's nuclear or ballistic programmes will entail loss of rights under the credit insurance policy.

5. Vigilance on the part of States in order to prevent Iranian nationals from benefiting from postgraduate training which could contribute to Iran's nuclear and missile programmes

In order to prevent the transfer of knowledge or expertise that could be used in connection with proliferation programmes, Interministerial Instruction No. 486 of 1 March 1993 requires all heads of institutions that are subject to a strict security regime or controlled access to seek authorization from the senior clearance officer of the relevant ministry in order to admit a visitor or trainee who is not a national of the European Union. No authorization will be granted for Iranian nationals wishing to undergo training in such an institution, if the latter is linked to the nuclear or missile fields.

Activities are under way to make all security and clearance officials in the relevant institutions aware of the adoption of resolution 1737 (2006) so as to inform them of the need:

- To be particularly strict in applying Interministerial Instruction No. 486 to Iranian nationals;
- To identify any Iranian nationals attending their institutions prior to the adoption of the resolution;
- To be watchful for, and to prevent, the development of cooperation in sensitive areas between the institution under their responsibility and Iranian institutions;
- To urge the scientific community to be cautious in accepting invitations from Iranian research institutions.

Moreover, since the adoption of resolution 1696 (2006), French consular authorities have exercised heightened vigilance in regard to long-stay visa applications for studies in France submitted by Iranian nationals.

United Nations S/AC.50/2007/18

Security Council

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5 March 2007

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Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)

Letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

The United States Mission has the honour to attach its report pursuant to paragraph 19 of resolution 1737 (2006) on the steps taken by the Government of the United States to implement paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 17 of the above-mentioned resolution (see annex).

(*Signed*) Alejandro D. **Wolff**
Chargé d'affaires

07-25772 (E) 130307

Annex to the letter dated 21 February 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United States Mission to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee

United States 60-Day Report for the United Nations Security Council Efforts Towards Implementing UNSCR 1737

The United States believes it is essential that Member States fully and effectively implement their obligations under UNSCR 1737. The United States is considering a range of measures to implement UNSCR 1737. This includes application of further trade and assistance restrictions, where appropriate, and working with other states to prevent trade prohibited by the resolution.

Following the structure of UNSCR 1737, U.S. actions to implement its requirements to date are as follows:

Paragraph 3: *All Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, namely:*

(a) those set out in sections B.2, B.3, B.4, B.5, B.6, and B.7 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814;
(b) those set out in sections A.1 and B.1 of INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1 in document S/2006/814, except the supply, sale or transfer of:

- *i. equipment covered by B.1 when such equipment is for light water reactors;*
- *ii. low-enriched uranium covered by A.1.2 when it is incorporated in assembled nuclear fuel elements for such reactors;*

(c) those set out in document S/2006/815, except the supply, sale or transfer of items covered by 19 A.3 of Category II;
(d) any additional items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, determined as necessary by the Security Council or the Committee established by paragraph 18 below (herein "the Committee"), which could contribute to enrichment-related, or reprocessing, or heavy water-related activities or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

S/2006/814: *INFCIRC 254/Rev.8/Part 1, Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology*

The United States does not permit the export or re-export of any items that could contribute to Iran's nuclear programs. This includes all of the items specifically listed in UN document S/2006/814. The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger Committee, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and through outreach programs to non-member countries, to prevent the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related equipment, materials,

software and related technology to or from Iran that could contribute to the development, production or delivery of nuclear weapons. Relevant U.S. authorities include the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, the latter of which is the legal authority for the Executive Orders that established a comprehensive U.S. trade embargo against Iran.

S/2006/815: Missile Technology, Equipment and Software

The United States does not permit the export or re-export of any items that could contribute to Iran's missile programs. This includes all of the items specifically listed in UN document S/2006/815. The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the PSI, to prevent the transfer of missile-related equipment, materials, software and related technology to or from Iran that could contribute to the development or production of missiles. Relevant U.S. authorities include the AECA and the IEEPA.

Paragraph 4: *All Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from their territories, or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft to, or for the use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not originating in their territories, of the following items, materials, equipment, goods and technology:*

(a) those set out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities;
(b) any other items not listed in documents S/2006/814 or S/2006/815 if the State determines that they would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy water-related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
(c) any further items if the State determines that they would contribute to the pursuit of activities related to other topics about which the IAEA has expressed concerns or identified as outstanding;

S/2006/814: INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2, Nuclear-related Dual-use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology

The United States does not permit the export to Iran of any items that could contribute to Iran's nuclear programs. This includes all of the items specifically listed in UN document S/2006/814. The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the NSG, the Zangger Committee, the PSI, and through outreach programs to non-member countries, to prevent the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related equipment, materials, software and related technology to or from Iran that could contribute to the development, production, or delivery of nuclear weapons. Exports and re-exports of items from the NSG Dual Use List to Iran are prohibited both by the AECA and IEEPA, the latter of which is the legal authority for the Executive Orders that established a comprehensive U.S. trade embargo against Iran.

S/2006/815: Missile Technology, Equipment, and Software

The United States does not permit the export or reexport to Iran of any items that could contribute to Iran's missile programs. This includes all of the items specifically listed in UN document S/2006/815. The United States also works with likeminded countries, including through the MTCR and PSI, to prevent the transfer of missile-related materials to or from Iran that could contribute to development or production of missiles.

Paragraph 5: *Decides that, for the supply, sale or transfer of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology covered by documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 the export of which is not prohibited by subparagraphs 3 (b), 3(c), or 4(a) above, States shall ensure that:*

(a) the requirements, as appropriate, of the Guidelines as set out in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/985 have been met; and
(b) they have obtained and are in a position to exercise effectively a right to verify the end-use and end-use location of any supplied item; and
(c) they notify the Committee within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer; and
(d) in the case of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology contained in document S/2006/814, they also notify the IAEA within ten days of the supply, sale or transfer;

The United States does not permit the export to Iran of any items that could contribute to Iran's nuclear or missile programs. This includes all of the items specifically listed in UN documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815. Exports and re-exports of items from either list to Iran are prohibited both by the AECA and IEEPA, the latter of which is the legal authority for the Executive Orders that established a comprehensive trade embargo against Iran.

Paragraph 6: *Decides that all States shall also take the necessary measures to prevent the provision to Iran of any technical assistance or training, financial assistance, investment, brokering or other services and the transfer of financial resources or services, related to the supply, sale, transfer, manufacture or use of the prohibited items, materials, equipment, goods and technology specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 above;*

The comprehensive U.S. trade embargo on Iran, established pursuant to the AECA and Executive Orders issued under the authority of IEEPA, prohibits all technical assistance or training to Iran as pertains to the items covered in paragraphs 3 and 4 of UNSCR 1737. The United States also works with like-minded countries, including through the NSG, the Zangger Committee, MTCR, PSI, and through outreach programs to non-member countries, to prevent transfers to Iran of technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items in paragraphs 3 and 4 of UNSCR 1737.

As for preventing financial assistance or services to Iran's nuclear weapon and delivery system activities, in June 2005, the President signed Executive Order 13382 (Blocking

Property Supporters). The Order allows the United States to block or "freeze" the property and assets, subject to U.S. jurisdiction, of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. Persons that are designated under the Order are denied access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems, and U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. This national authority also allows the United States to implement effectively the provisions set forth in operative paragraphs 6 and 12. Financial assistance and financial services to Iran's nuclear weapon and delivery system activities are also prohibited as part of the comprehensive U.S. embargo on trade in goods, technology and services with Iran, which is maintained pursuant to Executive Orders issued under the authority of IEEPA.

The U.S. government in January 2007 designated Bank Sepah, the fifth largest Iranian state-owned bank, pursuant to Executive Order 13382 for providing direct and extensive financial services to Iranian missile-related firms designated in the annex to Resolution 1737.

Paragraph 7: *Decides that Iran shall not export any of the items in documents S/2006/814 and S/2006/815 and that all Member States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran;*

Items of Iranian origin covered under both lists may not be imported into the United States either directly or through third countries, without prior authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. The U.S. ban on Iranian-origin imports is maintained pursuant to Executive Orders issued under the authority of IEEPA.

Paragraph 10: *Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in this regard that all States shall notify the Committee of the entry into or transit through their territories of the persons designated in the Annex to this resolution (herein "the Annex"), as well as of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and for the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods, equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, except where such travel is for activities directly related to the items in subparagraphs 3(b)(i) and (ii) above;*

The implementation of the travel notification requirement will be addressed through the U.S. Department of State's targeted visa review process under the Immigration and Nationality Act that focuses on individuals reasonably believed to be seeking entry into the United States to engage in an activity to violate or evade U.S. export control laws.

Under these provisions, any requests by relevant individuals designated in accordance with resolution 1737 for visas to travel to or through the United States would be denied. Because such persons will not be permitted to enter into or transit through the United States, we do not anticipate that notifications to the Sanctions Committee will be required.

Paragraph 12: *Decides that all States shall freeze the funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories at the date of adoption of this resolution or at any time thereafter, that are owned or controlled by the persons or entities designated in the Annex, as well as those of additional persons or entities designated by the Security Council or by the Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing support for Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, or by persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, including through illicit means, and that the measures in this paragraph shall cease to apply in respect of such persons or entities if, and at such time as, the Security Council or the Committee removes them from the Annex, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any persons or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of these persons and entities;*

On June 28, 2005, the President signed Executive Order 13382 (Blocking Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters). The Order allows the United States to block or "freeze" the property and interests in property within the United States, or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, of weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their supporters. Persons that are designated under the Order are denied access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems, and U.S. persons, wherever located, are prohibited from engaging in transactions with them. This national authority allows the United States to implement effectively the provisions set forth in operative paragraphs 6 and 12 of resolution 1737.

Pursuant to Executive Order 13382, the United States Government has designated 14 entities for their involvement in Iranian nuclear or missile activities. Five of those designated entities) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Shahid Bakeri Industrial Group, Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, Mesbah Energy Company, and Kalaye Electric Company) were also listed in the Annex of UNSCR 1737. As indicated above, the U.S. designation of these entities effectively blocks, or "freezes" , their assets within the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons and prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with these entities.

The United States will continue to take measures to fully implement its obligations under the resolution and work to designate the remaining individuals and entities from the UNSCR 1737 Annex is continuing.

Paragraph 17: *Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of Iranian nationals, within their territories or by their nationals, of*

disciplines which would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;

Implementation of this requirement will be enforced through the U.S. Department of State targeted visa review process, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, that focuses on individuals reasonably believed to be seeking entry into the United States to engage in an activity to violate or evade U.S. export control laws, including by obtaining access to sensitive technology. Under these provisions, any requests by relevant Iranian nationals for visas to travel to or through the United States would be denied. In addition, the comprehensive prohibitions on the sale, supply, export or re-export of goods, technology or services to Iran, maintained under Executive orders issued pursuant to IEEPA, apply to such goods, technology or services provided in the United States to persons normally resident in Iran or to the Government of Iran.